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 This thesis examines Japanese baseball and how the use of analytics and statistical 
research has been implemented into Nippon Professional Baseball (NPB), compared to its North 
American counterpart, Major League Baseball (MLB). Due to the large financial implications of 
the MLB, teams have fully adopted the use of advanced metrics to find competitive disparities 
and advantages in roster construction, game strategies, and player development. Because of the 
long history attached to baseball in Japan, many cultural differences have adapted the game and 
recently slowed the growth of sabermetrics. While the NPB is beginning to understand the 
competitive value that analytics provide, the involvement of large conglomerates in the 
ownership, operations, and governance of the league alter the considerations teams face when 
implementing a research-based strategy. Because of this ownership structure, the true value of 
statistical research is not entirely clear. How the teams, and corporations, choose to navigate this 
phenomenon within the game will not only reveal the purpose of the franchises’ existence, but 
also will affect the competitiveness, value, success of Nippon Professional Baseball as the 2nd 











 While historically considered “America’s National Pastime,” baseball has become an 
increasingly international game. Major League Baseball, considered the highest level of 
professional baseball in the world, had a player pool consisting of 28.4% foreign-born players on 
2020 Opening Day rosters (“Opening Day Rosters,” 2020). This figure is higher than the 
National Basketball Association, a league that has aggressively invested in expanding its global 
presence, which has 23% of its players coming from abroad (Anderson, 2020). These players 
represent 20 different countries; the majority come from the Caribbean and Central America, 
where baseball is hugely popular, with others come from Asia and Europe (See Figures 1 & 2). 
These countries contain their own top-level professional leagues where many of these 
international players begin their career, namely the KBO League in Korea, the Dominican 
Professional Baseball League in the Dominican Republic, the Mexican League and Mexican 
Pacific League in Mexico, and Nippon Professional Baseball in Japan. From the highest level all 
the way to the bottom, baseball has become an inherently international game with talent coming 
from all over the globe. MLB teams have been forced to expand scouting footprints to capture 
this growth and to compete with other teams and leagues for talent. 
 Along with international growth, MLB revenues and salaries are consistently increasing, 
and the sport is more lucrative than ever. While the COVID-19 pandemic negatively affected 
revenues for sports leagues worldwide in 2020, with fans not being able to attend games, the 
MLB had a record $10.7 billion in revenue in 2019. This was the 17th consecutive year that the 
league has seen record revenues, a trend that is expected to continue with the implementation of 
new television deals (Brown, 2019). As revenues increase, players demand higher compensation. 
Over the 40-year span from 1980 to 2020, the average MLB salary increased by 1,052%, 
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adjusted for inflation (Anderson, 2020). Players have also been able to negotiate increasingly 
larger contracts with multiple years of guaranteed money. Since 2015, there have been 6 free 
agent contracts or extensions worth over $300 million, each with a span between 10 and 14 years 
(Langs, 2021). The last 20 years have forced teams to consider the wisdom of tying themselves 
down to giant, multi-year contracts, especially as players’ health, talent, and ability over time 
continue to be factors. Further, teams must be able to supplement the expensive established talent 
with young and inexpensive players whose ability is often difficult to predict. As a result of these 
trends, teams have been forced to think differently about how they evaluate players, both in 
terms of deciding who to award a large contract and the areas in which they can find value in 
unproven players where other teams can’t. 
 Major League teams have implemented this historically unorthodox thinking with the use 
of analytical tools and statistical analysis. Rather than basketball or soccer where players move 
freely within a playing field with a set amount of time on the clock, baseball progresses based on 
various events or outcomes. Players are delegated to a generally “fixed” position and each “play” 
must be initiated with one specific player, the pitcher, throwing a pitch to one specific hitter. The 
outcome-based nature of the game allows statistics to be more easily measured or tracked 
relative to other sports. Additionally, baseball seasons are considerably longer than other sports 
with each MLB team playing 162 games a year, providing very large amounts of available data. 
Teams can analyze league-wide trends, create in-game strategic decision-making tools, project 
overall team success, or develop the skillset of individual players, all using math and statistical 
analysis. For example, the Houston Astros traded for Gerrit Cole, a statistically average pitcher 
from the Pittsburgh Pirates, before the 2018 season. The Astros deduced from his data that he 
would improve his pitching by increasing the spin rate on his fastball, throwing more pitches up 
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in the strike-zone, and decreasing the overall number of fastballs he threw (Sawchik, 2019). 
After implementing these minute changes in his pitching style, Cole established himself as one 
of the league’s best and most dominant starting pitchers. In 2019, he went on to lead the 
American League in earned run average and number of strikeouts and guide the team to the 
World Series as the #1 pitcher in their rotation. That season, he finished second in voting for the 
Cy Young award, an honor given to the best pitcher in each league. After the 2019 season, he 
signed the largest free agent contract for a pitcher in history with the New York Yankees, a deal 
worth $324 million over nine years (Hoch, 2019). The large amount of available data, combined 
with various levels and types of analysis, create infinite opportunities for baseball teams to find 
market inefficiencies and field the most competitive, cost efficient teams. 
 In Japan, baseball is the most popular sport with 42.8% of citizens claiming it as their 
favorite (Chuo Research Inc., 2018). Japan’s national team, Samurai Japan, is currently ranked 
number one in the World Baseball and Softball Confederation Rankings and won the 2019 
Premier12 tournament against the other international teams ranked in the top 12. The country’s 
top league, Nippon Professional Baseball, had an estimated total attendance of 26,536,962 in 
2019 (“WBSC Rankings,” 2020; “観客動員数(2019年),” 2021). This was second in the world 
only to Major League Baseball in the U.S., which has almost three times as many teams and 
longer seasons. The NPB is widely considered by scouts as “AAAA,” meaning the level of play 
is not as high as what you would see in a typical MLB game, but is higher than the top minor 
league in the U.S. with a “AAA” rating. The league is popular, and the level of play is high, 
however analytics have not yet been widely accepted in Japan as they have in the U.S., with the 
MLB having shifted to analytics-based scouting and strategy almost 20 years ago. While some 
NPB teams have made significant steps towards implementing analytical research in their 
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organizations, various cultural differences have stood in the way. This thesis seeks to explore the 
reasons why Japanese teams have been slow to adapt, how analytics have been embraced thus 
far, and important factors that teams must consider as the Japanese league’s use of analytical 
strategies grows.  
 
Baseball in Japan 
 Baseball has been a part of Japanese culture for almost 150 years. The game was first 
brought to Japan during the Meiji Era in 1873 by English and American History teacher Horace 
Wilson. While teaching at Kaisei-ko, the modern-day University of Tokyo, he taught his students 
the rules and fundamentals of baseball to give them more physical activity. Competitive games 
were soon organized between classmates and teachers and the sport began to gain popularity in 
Tokyo. High school and college teams were formed around the Tokyo area, with the first 
professional team being formed in 1883 by a railway engineer named Hiroshi Hiraoka (Whiting, 
1989).  
 In 1898, high schools and universities around the country began to quickly adopt the 
game and create teams after the Ichiko School beat a team consisting entirely of Americans with 
a score of 29 to 4 (Whiting, 1989). With regular competition, amateur baseball gained an 
enormous following, entrenching itself in Japanese culture at the start of the 20th century. 
Japan’s university students that adopted baseball enjoyed the game and went on to become 
government and community leaders. This gave baseball popularity among the upper class and 
provided a foundation for the game to be implemented professionally and grow (Ikei, 2000).  
 Although many independent clubs were taking shape in the early 20th century, no formal 
professional league existed. However, in 1934, the Yomiuri Shimbun, a popular national 
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newspaper, sponsored a team of Japanese “all-stars” to compete against a visiting American all-
star team – that included Babe Ruth – in hopes of generating an increase in newspaper 
circulation (Whiting, 1989). The visit proved widely successful, and the Yomiuri-sponsored team 
remained together to form the modern-day Yomiuri Giants, who, based in Tokyo, are Japan’s 
most popular team (Chuo Research Inc, 2018). Six other teams were created by 1936, thereby 
establishing the Japanese Baseball League as the first professional baseball league in Japan. The 
league continued to develop successfully until World War II. Many players left to fight in the 
war, eventually causing the league to stop play for a year due to a lack of players.  
 Following the war, the post-war economic boom allowed the league to grow and become 
what it is today. In 1950, the Japanese Baseball League was reorganized into the present-day 
“Nippon Professional Baseball” league, with major corporations heavily investing in 
professional teams. The new wide-spread use of the television allowed the league to take off and 
gain a following nationwide (Whiting, 1989). Since the reorganization, NPB has produced many 
talented players, some having successfully transferred to Major League Baseball in pursuit of 
higher salary, wider fame, and heightened baseball performance. These players, like Ichiro 
Suzuki, Hideki Matsui, and Hideo Nomo, have gone on to be modern-day Japanese cultural 
icons. 
  The nature of the game of baseball is also very in line with Japanese culture and 
character, providing reason as to why the game caught on and has remained a staple of Japanese 
culture since its introduction. Baseball has a slow pace when compared with other American 
sports. There is no predetermined clock or length of time, only a fixed number of innings – nine 
– that only increases in the event of a tie. The progression of the game is largely dependent on 
the rate in which the pitcher throws the ball to home plate and that in which a team accumulates 
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players being called “out.” Therefore, the game moves at a pace that contains small breaks 
between pitches, situations, and innings. The Japanese people are generally considered to have a 
reactive culture, one characterized by attentive listeners that absorb information and take their 
time to arrive at a conclusion or give a response. Robert Whiting, a writer and journalist who has 
covered baseball in Japan for over 40 years, said, “The Japanese are extremely careful. They like 
to fully discuss and analyze a problem before reaching a decision” (Whiting, 1989). The time 
between pitches and innings allows for the discussion and strategic analysis of situations in order 
to make good, rational decisions. The Japanese fans appreciate this aspect of the game and 
consider it to be an important and exciting part. The game also falls in line with the importance 
of the group and individual challenges or tests in Japanese culture. “When their teams clashed, 
the excitement was over not only the battle between two teams, but also over the one-on-one 
battle between individuals. For the fans, it was breathtaking, like watching a fight-to-the-death 
sword duel in a samurai movie” (Ikei, 2000). These cultural values changed the game over time, 
giving the country its own unique version and style of baseball.  
 Today, Nippon Professional Baseball is still Japan’s top professional baseball league, 
with over $1.3 billion in revenue (“観客動員数(2019年),” 2021). The league contains 12 teams 
spread across 11 different prefectures, spanning the entire country with the Hokkaido Nippon-
Ham Fighters located in the northern Sapporo and the Fukuoka Softbank Hawks located in the 
southern Fukuoka (See Figure 3). The 12 teams are divided into two leagues, the Central and the 
Pacific, with six teams in each (See Figure 4). Similar to Major League Baseball, one league, the 
Pacific, uses the designated hitter (where another player can hit in place of one of the players in 
the field, typically the pitcher) while the other, the Central, does not. NPB teams play 143 regular 
season games, 19 fewer than MLB, but the season still occurs over the same time period from 
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April through September, with the postseason taking place in October. At the conclusion of the 
regular season the top 3 teams from each league by record, compete in the Climax Series playoff 
tournament. This tournament determines the two league champions that will meet in the Japan 
Series, similar to the World Series of MLB, which determines the overall champion of the NPB 
league. However, the NPB playoffs are different from the MLB in that the first-place finishers 
from each league at the end of the regular season receive a first-round bye as well as a one-game 
advantage in the second round (Ikei, 2000).  
 Both leagues also contain similar systems for player development and acquisition. 
Professional teams hold an annual draft where they can fairly select and sign players from both 
the high school and college level. These players can then be added directly to the team to 
compete in the upcoming season or be placed in the minor leagues for further development. 
Should the minor league players prove their ability to executives, they can then be called up to 
join the top team at a later date.  
 While the NPB is the top professional league in Japan, the high school level competition 
that provided the foundation for the growth of the sport and formation of a professional league 
still remains prominent. Every year, two major high school tournaments receive national 
attention and media coverage. The tournaments, known as “Koshien,” consist of local teams 
from various prefectures, demonstrating the importance of baseball to the country at a 
fundamental, grassroots level. People enjoy the narrative of their local team progressing through 
each stage of the tournament and making a name for themselves on the national stage (Ikei, 
2000). Baseball in the U.S. lacks this localized element of the game because it gained popularity 
through professional leagues, not amateur ones. 
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 While MLB games will be played until a winner is decided, regardless of the time or 
number of innings played, the NPB allows for ties games. In NPB, regular season games that are 
tied after 12 innings, or those that reach a 3 and ½ hour time limit, end with both teams accepting 
a draw. This difference is representative of how the game was adapted for Japanese taste as well 
as innate cultural differences between the two countries. In a piece about American sports 
leagues moving away from the possibility of ties, Frank Deford from Sports Illustrated wrote, “A 
tie has no place in sports. It's like not finding out who is the ‘who’ in whodunit,” reflecting a 
widely accepted sentiment among Americans that someone must be named a winner. Some 
former Americans that played in Japan attribute the aspect of ties to the cultural custom of 
“saving face,” arguing that Japanese players are content with ties because no one will go home a 
loser (Whiting, 1989). However, Wayne Graczyk of the Japan Times offers a more pragmatic 
reason, saying, “Because Japanese teams do not have their own private transportation, and fans 
need to get home while the trains are still running, night games cannot go into the wee hours of 
the following morning as they sometimes do in the major leagues.” Either way, the collectivist 
ideas important in ensuring the game is practical for each party involved represent the influence 
of each country’s culture on their version of baseball. 
 
The Japanese Posting System 
 A critical component of the relationship between the MLB and NPB is the posting 
system, which provides a framework under which NPB players that have not yet reached free 
agency can move to the MLB and sign a new contract. Historically, Japanese players have had 
little labor protection and working rights relative to their MLB counterparts, aligning with 
Japan’s historically tough work culture. For example, the MLB and the Major League Baseball 
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Players’ Association (MLBPA) entered the first ever collective bargaining agreement (CBA), in 
any sports league, in 1968. This gave the players more leverage in contract negotiations and the 
power was shared between both owners and players, unlike before (Snyder, 2009). The NPB has 
no such agreement and a player’s salary is largely left at the mercy of ownership. The concept of 
free agency, a player’s ability to negotiate a contract with any team, was not implemented into 
Japanese baseball until 1993, 18 years after the MLB adopted it. Even then, MLB players reach 
free agency after six years of major league service time, starting from the date of their major 
league debut. NPB players don’t reach free agency until they accumulate nine years of service 
time. (“Free Agency,” n.d.; “International Free Agency—Asia (Professional),” n.d.). Prior to 
1993, players were expected to play for their team “for life,” a concept that comes from Japanese 
corporate culture in which graduates are hired by large firms directly out of college with the 
understanding they will be given lifetime job security in return for absolute commitment to the 
company. Although this idea is beginning to be phased out in Japan, the underlying authority 
employers have over their employees remains prevalent, even in baseball (Murakami, 2019).  
 Until the posting system was implemented in 1998, Japanese players had no freedom to 
pursue greater compensation, competition, and exposure by moving to the MLB because of rules 
related to contractual obligations in the U.S.-Japan Player Contract Agreement. Others had tried, 
but none found success until Hideo Nomo moved to the Los Angeles Dodgers prior to the 1995 
season. Nomo had a growing distaste for the Japanese style of practices that didn’t promote rest 
and recovery for players. His manager, while playing for the Kintetsu Buffaloes, Keiishi Suzuki, 
said, “The best way to cure a sore arm is to throw more” (Whiting, 2010). Nomo had previously 
won the Pacific League MVP award and was confident in his ability to play in the MLB after 
comparing himself to visiting MLB All-Star teams, so he expressed to his agent, Don Nomura, 
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that he wanted to move. Nomura then found a loophole in the Japanese Uniform Players Contract 
called the "voluntary retirement" clause, which ruled that a player who retired and wanted to 
make a comeback had to play for his former team as long as he stayed in Japan. Under this 
clause, Nomo could voluntarily retire from the NPB and then be free to negotiate and sign a 
contract with an MLB team (Whiting, 2010). So, Nomo exercised this loophole to retire from the 
NPB and sign with the Dodgers prior to the 1995 season, later going on to win MLB Rookie of 
the Year (“Hideo Nomo Signs Three-Year Contract With Dodgers,” 1996).  
 After two similar instances of players escaping to the MLB, the commissioners of both 
leagues agreed to establish a posting system, allowing players to move to the MLB and the 
Japanese teams to receive compensation in the form of a posting fee. The Japanese teams argued 
for this compensation in order to mitigate the loss of their most talented – and generally most 
marketable – players to MLB teams with much larger payrolls and financial resources. While the 
agreement has been modified over time, early iterations involved a bidding process in which 
teams would blindly bid on players that were posted, without any knowledge of other team’s bids 
and their amount. This would sometimes result in posting fees greater than $50 million (See 
Figure 5). To avoid those high posting fees, an agreement negotiated prior to the 2013-2014 
posting window included a maximum fee of $20 million. This was determined by the NPB team 
to which the player had contractual rights and gave the player the opportunity to negotiate with 
any MLB team willing to pay the fee (Corcoran, 2013). Under the current agreement, in effect 
since the end of the 2018 MLB and NPB seasons, players can be posted during a window from 
November 1st to December 5th. All 30 MLB teams then have the right to negotiate with the 
posted player for 30 days after the initial posting date. If an agreement is not reached, the player 
must return to his Japanese club and cannot be posted again until the next year’s posting 
 15 
window. If the player and an MLB team do reach an agreement, the NPB team will receive a 
posting fee dependent on the amount of guaranteed money that player signs for. NPB teams will 
receive 20% of the first $25 million, 17.5% of the next $25 million, and 15% of any amount in 
excess of $50 million. For players that end up signing minor league contracts, the fee is 25% 
regardless of the value (“Japanese Posting System,” n.d.).  
 This new system has significantly benefited both MLB teams and Japanese players 
seeking new opportunities. The players have much more freedom in being able to negotiate with 
any team instead of being restricted to joining whichever team placed the highest bid. By 
calculating the fee as a percentage of the contract, rather than a flat fee, the cost of acquiring a 
player is directly tied to his perceived value by the MLB team while the risk is lowered if that 
player doesn’t perform as expected. For example, the Texas Rangers paid the Hokkaido Nippon-
Ham Fighters a posting fee of $51,703,411 for pitcher Yu Darvish in 2011, when the system 
gave negotiation rights to the highest bidder (See Figure 6). The Rangers then signed him to six-
year contract worth $60 million, meaning the total cost of Darvish for six years of play amounted 
to over $111 million. In 2018, after the current system came into effect, the Seattle Mariners paid 
the Saitama Seibu Lions $10,275,000 for pitcher Yusei Kikuchi after signing him to a four-year, 
$56 million deal. Although the size of the contracts was similar in terms of guaranteed money, 
the posting fee for Kikuchi was roughly 20% of Darvish’s. When evaluating the cost of the 
posting fee as a percentage of the total cost the team accrues by acquiring and signing a Japanese 
player, this measure has seen a decreasing trend as a result of the new agreement (See Figure 7). 
Under this system, MLB teams don’t need to risk as much in the sunk cost of a posting fee, and 
the incentive is greater than ever to pursue Japanese talent.  
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Growth of Sabermetrics in the United States 
 In the early 2000s, the Oakland Athletics became the first MLB team to widely, and 
publicly, implement statistical analysis into their baseball strategy and the construction of its 
roster, a concept known today as “sabermetrics.” As a team that had a significantly lower budget 
than others like the New York Yankees or Boston Red Sox, they were forced to compete with 
fewer resources and extract the most value they could out of their payroll. They did this using 
statistical theories developed by Bill James. James, an average fan who spent his night shifts as a 
security guard, wrote a series of abstracts that posed questions about baseball strategy and 
attempted to answer them with objective data as opposed to subjective. James’ ideas and 
reasoning directly contradicted the methods major league clubs used to evaluate players and 
formulate strategy, subjective methods based on feeling, experience, and knowledge of the game. 
James published his first abstract in 1977 and continued to publish other statistical works through 
the 80s and 90s to little success. However, the A’s embraced his ideas roughly 25 years after his 
first publication and implemented a strategy of signing players they believed were undervalued 
to compete with the wealthier teams. Despite widespread ridicule from other scouts and teams, 
the A’s qualified for the 2002 postseason after losing their 3 core players from previous seasons 
to free agency. This qualification proved that success could be found using a statistics-based 
strategy (Lewis, 2004). Bill James was later hired by the Boston Red Sox in 2003, who went on 
to win the World Series in 2004 by constructing a bullpen of undervalued relief pitchers and 
placing importance on the on-base percentage statistic, both suggestions from James (Goldman, 
2005).  
 In the 15-20 years since the A’s Success, every major league team has implemented the 
use of analytics into its operations in some form or another, and those that have fully embraced it 
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have generally had more consistent success than others. The Houston Astros, the team that 
developed Gerrit Cole into a pitcher the Yankees valued at $324 million as described earlier, 
have become known as one of the most developed teams in statistical analysis. In 2011, the 
Astros hired Jeff Lunhow as their new general manager. Lunhow was an executive responsible 
for building the St. Louis Cardinals analytics department that helped them win the World Series 
in 2011 and reach the playoffs each of the following four years. With the Astros, Lunhow spent 
time developing the team’s analytics department and convincing the staff, scouts, coaches, and 
players to buy in. Irving Wladawsky from the Wall Street Journal described the process after 
interviewing Lunhow, “First, he had to get the player-acquisition decision makers to leverage 
data to help them make better decisions. That was the relatively easier part. Much harder was 
convincing the coaches and players across the Astros’ organization, including their extensive 
minor leagues and player development system, to use all the available information in their every-
day decisions, such as game-day lineups and defensive configurations. That took three to four 
years of really hard work.” The process of overcoming deep-rooted strategic thinking was not a 
rapid one, but eventually the Astros became one of the most forward-thinking organizations in 
the MLB. From 2017 to 2020, the Astros reached four American League Championship Series, 
won two of them to reach the World Series twice, and won the World Series in 2017. As of 
February 2021, they have 44 employees in their baseball operations department alone, with 18 
having the key word “R&D,” “analyst,” “analysis,” “developer,” “research,” “systems,” or 
“information” in their job title (“Astros Front Office Directory,” n.d.).  
 While the Astros are one of the best teams at developing players through the use of 
analytics, as they did with Cole, they are still a large-market team that has considerable resources 
and the ability to sign expensive free-agents. Conversely, the Tampa Bay Rays have been noted 
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as one of the best teams at finding value in unknown players; they have to in order to remain 
competitive as a small-market team. Because the Rays cannot afford to be very active in the free 
agent market like other teams with large payrolls, they rely on maintaining a talent pool full of 
young, inexpensive players whose ability is identified through the use of analytics (Shaikin, 
2020). Once their prospects prove themselves, they either leave for teams that can offer higher 
compensation, or the Rays trade them for other young prospects that can replenish their talent 
pool, much to the dismay of their few veteran players like Blake Snell (Bumbaca, 2019). This 
strategy has brought the Rays success over the past few seasons, including a World Series 
appearance in 2020, despite having the third lowest payroll in the league (Lee & Schoenfield, 
2020). 
 The Los Angeles Dodgers are another example of an organization that has found success 
after investing heavily in analytics. While they do have the ability to maintain one of the highest 
payrolls in the MLB and spend large sums of money on top-level talent, like right fielder Mookie 
Betts, they also have one of the largest departments dedicated to analytics in the league 
(Verducci, 2020; Paine, 2020). According to their front office directory, they have 66 employees 
in their baseball operations department, 22 of which have the same key words related to analytics 
staff used for the Astros’ front office in their job title (“Front Office Directory, n.d.). One unique 
caveat about the Dodgers is their ability to sign expensive free agents like the Astros, while 
consistently replenishing their young talent pool like the Rays. They routinely acquire a large 
number of young players to develop them, in hopes of a few eventually becoming top players 
that can be brought up to the Major League level. Analytics are not only used for the Dodgers at 
the top level, but throughout their entire farm system of minor league teams for development. 
Neil Paine from statistical journal, FiveThirtyEight, stated “the beauty of these Dodgers is that 
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they don’t exist in that continuum between contending and rebuilding. They rebuild and they 
contend, all at once.” The Dodgers are using analytics to properly assign value to free agents, 
develop players to be more competitive, and find younger, undervalued players all at once. This 
core competency of the organization has permitted them to be a sustained, competitive 
powerhouse in the National League, winning eight straight NL West Division titles, three of the 
last four National League Championship Series, and the most recent World Series in 2020.  
 Although the Red Sox proved that teams could win a World Series with the use of 
analytical methods in 2004, it took roughly another 15 years for teams to fully adapt and realize 
success as a result. For perspective, the New York Mets were one of the last teams to invest 
significantly in analytics. Kyle Newman, a writer for ESNY who is both a Mets fan and 
statistical writer, wrote in October of 2020, “Advanced analytics never took off in Queens. The 
Wilpons were vehemently against the idea of numbers controlling a baseball team. Despite calls 
from the likes of Omar Minaya, Sandy Alderson, and Brodie Van Wagenen, they refused to 
expand. As a result, the Mets now have the second smallest analytics department in MLB.” 
However, this is beginning to change with new owner Steve Cohen, signified by four new jobs 
posted on the Mets’ career and job openings page in February of 2021 that are analytical roles.  
 This 15-year time frame was partially due to ownership and personnel within teams 
needing to accept the change and learn how to properly use the information to make better 
decisions, but technology also played a role. What the A’s were doing in the early 2000s largely 
used outcome-based, box score data, like on-base percentage, to project overall trends over the 
course of the season. Now that data-tracking systems like Statcast and TrackMan are widely 
available, teams have much greater access to performance data. Lunhow of the Astros also said, 
“Today, it’s completely different. We now have so much technology around the ballpark and 
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information about the trajectory of the ball, the physics of the bat swing, the physics and the 
biomechanics of the pitcher’s delivery - so many components now that advanced sciences have 
worked into our game. It’s, quite frankly, overwhelming in terms of the amount of information 
that we have access to and intimidating to figure out how to analyze all that information, work 
through it, and come up with the takeaways that will allow you to continue to do what we tried to 
do back in 2003, which is to make better predictions about what players are going to do in the 
future on the field” (Wladawsky, 2018). Information from Statcast, a system that reports 
measurements from on-field action including exit velocity, launch angle, spin rate, and catch 
probability, to name a few, was not available in every major league ballpark until 2015 
(“Statcast,” n.d.; Chen, 2016). Now that more data than ever is widely available to every team, 
every MLB club in 2021 has some form of an analytics department dedicated to statistical 
research. Those that have the highest capability to extract meaning from it and find market 
inefficiencies will likely see the most success.  
 
Sabermetrics Come to Japan 
 The acceptance of analytics in Japan has followed a similar pattern to that in the MLB. 
Robert Whiting describes Japanese baseball as “conservative” and “orthodox,” noting that " 
It takes a while for new wrinkles from MLB to catch on in Japan.” Despite the growth in the 
U.S., the value of sabermetrics wasn’t quickly accepted in Japan. A man named Yusuke Okada, 
however, became fascinated in the application of statistics to baseball and decided to push for 
more sabermetric analysis of the Japanese game, earning the moniker, the “Bill James of Japan.” 
Okada, like James, was considered an outsider to the game; his first job out of school was at a 
call center. After seeing the success of Hideo Nomo in the MLB, he became interested in 
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American baseball and began reading statistical literature, including works published by James. 
Books about sabermetrics, specifically, stood out because the math made it easier for him to 
understand without any knowledge of English. Okada got his first job in baseball in the early 
2000s working for Nippon TV, in a role charged with creating statistical graphics for NPB 
broadcasts. However, there wasn’t much data available, and he often had to track metrics 
himself. By 2006, he left Nippon TV to work for Data Stadium, a company that tracked and sold 
pitch and batted ball data to NPB teams and media companies. However, those in leadership at 
the company were not interested in expanding their service into one that offered statistical 
analysis and research along with the data. Okada said, “I tried to explain the significance of 
advanced research to my bosses at Data Stadium as well as people working for NPB clubs, but 
they rarely listened to me. For about 10 years from 2002, no one tried to understand, or even 
cared about sabermetrics. … I was rejected right away.” Unable to change Data Stadium, Okada 
moved on and decided to start his own company in 2011, Deltagraphs. Able to collect the data he 
wanted, Okada hoped to prove the value of sabermetrics to NPB teams (Lindbergh, 2017b).  
 Deltagraphs is a website comparable to Fangraphs in the U.S., which is a baseball 
database, journal for statistical research and news articles, and general hub for those interested in 
sabermetrics. The site’s initial goal was to heighten awareness of analytics in Japan and grow the 
community of sabermetric researchers. What is different about Deltagraphs, however, is that the 
company also provides a service in the form of statistical consulting. They provide research and 
strategic recommendations to NPB teams as they only have one or two employees dedicated to 
research, if any at all. This began in 2012 when the Tohoku Rakuten Golden Eagles asked him to 
help create a “strategy and analytics” department within the organization. The team received a 
new team president, who didn’t have a background in baseball and was receptive to Okada’s 
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ideas. Okada said, describing meetings during the 2013 season, “It became clear that the 
manager agreed with my thoughts on the team’s weakness. The team climbed up the standings as 
he fixed the problem." The team went on to win the Japan Series later that year and solidified the 
new analytics department as a permanent aspect of the team (Lindbergh, 2017b). Even with the 
success of the 2013 Golden Eagles, it took Okada a few years to convince NPB teams of his 
value. In an October 2019 interview with Yoshiki Masaki, an employee at Deltagraphs, he noted 
that roughly half of NPB’s 12 teams use Deltagraphs’ consulting services, six years after Tohoku 
Rakuten’s championship (Y. Masaki, personal communication, October 31, 2019).  
 
Japanese Culture and Sabermetric Growth 
 In the same way that it was difficult for coaches in the U.S. to understand the value of 
implementing statistical research into their gameday decisions, Okada faced difficulty in 
persuading coaches and executives to use sabermetrics. He said, “When I was set to have a 
meeting with an NPB club, their baseball operations person, who was a former player, yelled at 
me. He said, ‘What are you doing here? You didn’t play at the professional level. Go home!’” 
(Lindbergh, 2017b). The coach’s reaction stemmed from a long-standing facet of Japanese 
culture: the “Senpai-Kouhai” relationship. “Senpai” translates to “senior” while “Kouhai” 
translates to “junior,” although the Japanese definition of this relationship is based on when a 
person, either earlier or later, joins an organization relative to the other. “Both Senpai and 
Kouhai are relative terms since both are based on comparisons of status, skills, age, and time of 
entrance into a group. In other words, Senpai exists only when there are Kouhai, and Kouhai 
exists only when there are Senpai” (Sano, 2014). For someone not employed directly by the 
team, especially one who never played or coached baseball, to suggest that a coach with decades 
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of baseball experience should do something differently, was in direct violation of this cultural 
custom. The Kouhai is supposed to follow and learn at all times, never questioning or doubting 
the Senpai’s ability. Those with analyst roles in an organization are typically younger with a 
degree related to programming or computing. In Japan, these younger people would be the last to 
offer any advice or suggestions to someone in a position of authority with baseball experience. 
“According to Guttridge, NPB teams still eschew infield shifts not because they aren’t aware that 
the tactic exists, but because shifting would imply that previous managers who didn’t shift were 
wrong not to have done so” (Lindbergh, 2017b). Despite the existence of a tactical advantage, 
the cultural customs prevail and are placed above competitiveness. 
 This lack of competitive drive is also apparent in the ownership structure of NPB clubs. 
For comparison, MLB teams are owned by individual owners or groups of owners known as a 
“consortium.” The teams operate as their own entities, seeking to make a profit by selling tickets, 
concessions, and merchandise, while also attempting to maximize their local television contracts. 
These contracts represent how much a television network is willing to pay for the rights to 
broadcast a team’s games. These contracts range from roughly $20 million a year all the way to 
$250 million a year and represent a significant portion of a team’s revenue stream, roughly 60% 
(Passan, 2020). Both the size of the TV contracts and the number of tickets sold are relatively 
dependent on that team’s success and level and competitiveness. The more a team wins, the 
higher their revenue will be. This makes the primary objective clear for MLB teams: construct 
the best possible roster, within financial limitations, that gives the club the best chance of 
winning. 
 This picture isn’t as clear in NPB as the clubs are owned by corporations rather than 
independent owners. The teams operate as a subsidiary of that company, and even include the 
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parent company’s name in their own (See Figure 8). This is why the Giants are the “Yomiuri 
Giants” rather than the “Tokyo Giants,” and why the Fukuoka SoftBank Hawks have an “SB” 
insignia on their hat rather than an “F” or “H.” The corporations run the clubs for the sole 
purpose of marketing their brand. “Owners tend to put the clubs in the promotion department and 
recognize that the main purpose of possession of the team is to promote the brand of products, 
outstanding image of enterprise, and good public relations to the mass etc.” (Lee et al., 2010). 
For these corporations, primetime TV advertising on a regular basis in Japan is far more costly 
than running a baseball team that markets the company itself. Further, those in the top positions 
of the front office running the club typically don’t have a baseball background and are simply 
executives placed there from the parent company. “Whereas MLB general managers lie awake at 
night thinking of ways to create a better team and increase profits, their Japanese counterparts 
toss and turn at night scheming for transfers back to the parent company” (Whiting, 2007). This 
makes it increasingly difficult to prove the value of analytics to ownership, even more so than 
coaches given that they don’t prioritize winning. 
 The owners, to their credit, don’t have much incentive to invest in analytics as most NPB 
teams don’t make a profit. “There are two teams that have historically done well. The Giants and 
Tigers both draw 3 million fans a year and each are estimated to take in somewhere in the 
neighborhood of 20 billion yen annually, the bulk of that in ticket sales and TV rights” (Whiting, 
2007). Even then, those profits are directly remitted back to the parent company. The teams 
themselves can’t reap the rewards from their own success and invest it back into the club. The 
rest of the teams don’t even have earnings to remit, and their parent companies regularly provide 
subsidies to keep them in operation. Much of their struggle is attributed to the significantly low 
television deals relative to the MLB. “Whereas the Giants are able to sell their TV rights at a 
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robust 100 million yen per game (and the Tigers around 50 million yen), the Dragons have to 
settle for a rather low 10 million yen for most of their home games, Nippon Ham 3.8 million yen 
and the Marines a piddling 150,000 yen” (Whiting, 2007). With TV revenues so low for most 
teams, executives don’t have reason to spend resources on competitiveness, especially since the 
teams will be bailed out by their parent companies regardless. The clubs serve their intended 
purpose as marketing tools and, as long as the parent company prioritizes that strategy, this lack 
of competitive spirit will not change, and investing in sabermetrics will not be a priority.  
 
Japanese Analytics Today 
 Despite these barriers, the use of analytics in Japanese baseball has grown since Okada 
got his foot in the door with the Tohoku Rakuten Golden Eagles. This growth can be represented 
by how many teams have a TrackMan radar system in their stadium. Though they might not be 
able to extract value from the data immediately, the tracking of the data itself indicates that they 
are moving in that direction. On TrackMan Baseball’s website, they claim that their system is 
used by the “majority of teams in Japan.” Teams do not directly publicize whether or not they 
use the system, so an exact number was determined based off of images uploaded to Google by 
individual contributors (See Figures 9 through 9I). The TrackMan system resembling a black box 
can be seen hanging above the stands behind home plate in 9 of the 12 NPB teams’ stadiums as 
of January 2021. These systems appear to have been implemented gradually from 2016 through 
2019, though the exact time frame of this is not certain as pictures of the specific area needed for 
examination were not available for every month of every year. The fact that 75% of the league 
now has access to batted ball data indicates that teams are beginning to transition to the use of 
sabermetrics for their strategy.  
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 One team, the Fukuoka SoftBank Hawks, has been noted as the team that has been most 
receptive and progressive in the analytical movement by Yoshi Masaki from Deltagraphs (Y. 
Masaki, personal communication, October 31, 2019). The Hawks are a client of Deltagraphs, 
were one of the first few teams to install TrackMan, and have won the Japan Series in six out of 
the last seven years, including four straight from 2017 through 2020. While other teams have 
implemented TrackMan, the Hawks have likely benefitted the most as they can leverage core 
competencies from their parent company related to information technology. SoftBank is 
multinational conglomerate with subsidiaries involved in telecommunications, financial services, 
and technology, and was the 66th largest company in the world according to the 2020 Forbes 
2000 (“Corporate History,” 2020; Murphy et al., 2020). They are more likely to have existing 
employees capable of quantitative analysis than teams like the Yomiuri Giants or Chunichi 
Dragons, both of which are owned by large newspapers, the Yomiuri Shimbun and Chunichi 
Shimbun, respectively (See Figure 8). While the team does have considerable resources and the 
ability to sign expensive players, tit is also one of the few NPB teams with a 3rd farm team. 
Fukuoka has significantly invested in expanding its developmental system, similar to the 
Dodgers, in hopes of finding inexpensive talent that will turn into valuable NPB players. In 2016, 
the team spent between ¥5 and ¥6 billion yen, roughly $60 million, on a brand-new farm system 
base in Chikugo, Japan (Nagatsuka, 2018). According to an image from 2016 uploaded to 
Google, the new main stadium even has TrackMan installed, indicating that the Hawks are not 
just using sabermetrics to evaluate their NPB squad, but also to more effectively develop their 
younger players. The head of Fukuoka’s Baseball Operations Unit, Sugihiko Mikasa, explained 
outright that the club’s strategy is to accumulate as many young players as possible and have 
them compete against one another for promotion, rather than relying on more traditional scouting 
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methods that choose which players to develop subjectively. Mikasa said “If one player out of 10 
gets promoted to the top team and does well, we can say our development is successful,” and “I 
came from a non-baseball background, but I’ve heard scouts say, ‘this player is good, this player 
isn’t, and things like that. But to me, there were just slight differences between those players. So, 
we want to have many players and let them compete with each other” (Nagatsuka, 2018). This 
system creates a pool of players that consistently produces talent capable of competing at the top 
level, setting the club up for long-term success.  
 The SoftBank Hawks are embracing a strategy and way of thinking more similar to a 
modern MLB team, rather than a traditional NPB one, and it is appearing to pay off. The team 
had the third largest attendance in NPB in 2017, trailing only the Yomiuri Giants and Hanshin 
Tigers, the only two profitable teams. The farm teams also drew 135,000 fans in 2017, almost 
seven times as many two years prior. With their success, more fans are buying tickets and the 
Hawks are bringing in more and more revenue. Although official figures are not publicly 
available, Mikasa indicated the yearly turnover in 2017 was greater than ¥30 billion for the first 
time ever (Nagatsuka, 2018). This growth can be expected to continue as the Hawks have created 
a sustainable competitive advantage in their development and analytical approach, setting 
themselves up to be regularly competitive in the future. If other clubs want to compete, they will 
have to continue to invest in research and development and embrace the analytical movement as 
the Hawks have. Otherwise, they will be left behind and remain uncompetitive.  
 
Considerations as Sabermetrics Grow in Nippon Professional Baseball 
 As more Japanese teams adopt analytics-based strategy, the methods they use will have to 
be adopted for the Japanese game. Okada from Deltagraphs said, “Basically, we replicate the 
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research done by American analysts and see if the same trend comes up or there’s a different 
outcome. Since we are behind stateside analysis, we have to do it that way” (Lindbergh, 2017b). 
While many trends from American baseball, like placing high value on batted ball exit speed for 
instance, can be valued similarly in Japan, other trends and models won’t be directly applicable. 
For example, many MLB teams use models on a macro, season long, level to project how many 
wins they expect to need to make the playoffs, as well as how many runs they’ll need to score to 
reach that number of wins. This analysis would have to be adapted to factor in the possibility of a 
tie in the NPB. Similar models might also not be as accurate or reliable considering the NPB 
plays fewer games in a season, resulting in lower amounts of available data. An accurate model 
like this, however, would be more valuable in the NPB considering the possibility of a first-
round bye and one-game advantage gained in the Climax Series if a team finishes with the best 
regular season record. Adopting strategies used in the MLB is a good steppingstone as teams first 
begin to implement analytics and learn the fundamentals of sabermetric approaches, however 
they will eventually have to find their own inefficiencies, specific to the Japanese style of play, 
that the other teams can’t easily replicate or copy.  
 One of the most notable plays in Japanese baseball that could change is the sacrifice bunt. 
The bunt is widely perceived as the epitome of self-sacrifice in the game of baseball – giving up 
the individual chance of success in order to provide a scoring opportunity for the team. Analytics 
show that the bunt rarely, if at all, provides the best statistical advantage, and the MLB’s best 
power hitters often play entire seasons without attempting a bunt. However, this trend has not yet 
caught on in Japan as the importance of the sacrifice of the individual for team success is deeply 
embedded in the culture. In 2017, NPB teams bunted 4.2 times the rate in which MLB teams 
bunted (Lindbergh, 2017b). Whether or not teams overcome this cultural characteristic and the 
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Japanese game sees a decrease in sacrifice bunts is yet to be seen, but can be expected as more 
teams adhere to sabermetric advice. 
 Even then, moving away from the sacrifice bunt might not be in the interest of teams 
given the abilities of the players. One player from the Hokkaido Nippon-Ham Fighters named 
Takuya Nakashima is viewed as a statistical embodiment of Japanese baseball. He hasn’t hit a 
single home run, has a ground ball rate of 74.4%, and has a pull-rate of 16.2%. Most interesting 
is that he led the league in sacrifices with 62, while the MLB leader the same year had 11. These 
statistics are indicative of his strategy as a contact player that relies on his speed and putting the 
ball in play, in any part of the field, hoping to simply get on base and give his team a chance to 
score. He also led the league in foul balls, often having eight to ten-pitch at bats where he wears 
down the pitcher and extends the game. A YouTube video documented a 12-pitch at bat in which 
Nakashima fought off pitch after pitch and prolonged the at-bat, while the fans’ cheers and 
excitement built throughout (See Figure 11). Despite managing a walk, the crowd roared as if he 
had just hit an extra base hit. His other highlight videos are entirely made up of great defensive 
plays, rather than other hitting highlights of home runs and extra base hits that are common for 
the MLB’s best players. Nakashima is “one of the most popular players on the team” and was 
even offered a roster spot on the Samurai Japan national team for the World Baseball Classic 
(Lindbergh, 2017a). 
 If the NPB follows the MLB trend and decides to employ the sacrifice bunt less 
frequently, the aesthetics of the game could be significantly affected, and it would have the 
potential to be displeasing to the fans. For example, analytics showed that pitchers could be most 
effective if brought in the game to face 1 specific hitter. The MLB game then experienced an 
increased number of pitching substitutions, much to the fans’ dismay as it slowed the game 
 30 
down. To combat this, the MLB implemented a rule in 2020 stipulating that pitchers must face a 
minimum of 3 batters in order to speed the game up (Petriello, 2019). NPB league officials will 
have to be prepared to implement rules, dependent on how changes in competitive strategy 
particular to the Japanese game affect viewing aesthetics, in order to keep the game appealing to 
a Japanese fan base. Conversely, the league has a whole could disregard this analytic strategy 
and continue to value players like Nakashima that are a better fit within the Japanese game. The 
statistical evidence from NPB games could point to bunting being an effective way to score 
considering the ability of Japanese players. In this situation, the analytical methods will have to 
be adapted and teams will have to find a way to properly evaluate players with this skillset. 
Regardless, teams will have to be prepared to find new methods of statistical analysis that fit the 
Japanese style of play, and league officials will have to be prepared to implement new rules to 
keep the game appealing to the Japanese market.  
 Another consideration the NPB will have to be aware of is the potential for a more active 
posting system. As Japanese players are more thoroughly evaluated with batted ball data and 
advanced metrics, MLB teams might be more inclined to invest in a posted player, especially 
considering that the cost of doing so has decreased with the revised posting rules. With more 
data available on players, teams can better project their success and the risk of spending money 
on a posting fee is decreased. The consequence of this is that NPB teams will lose their best 
players, who are often valuable marketing tools, reflecting why the posting system was 
implemented in the first place. To fight this NPB teams could choose not to share their data with 
MLB teams in hopes of protecting their best players and assets. They could focus on acquiring or 
developing players like Nakashima that are statistically valuable to the Japanese game, that likely 
wouldn’t be as valuable to MLB teams. An alternative strategy could embrace the transfer of 
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their players to the major leagues. A Japanese team could focus on developing players with 
skillsets that appeal to MLB teams like those with a lot of power and high exit velocities, capable 
of hitting homeruns and extra-base hits. This value could be marketed to MLB teams with 
statistical backing, and the NPB team could receive posting fees more frequently, potentially at 
higher values, as more players are posted. By properly leveraging their data, Japanese players 
could prove their value and ability with advanced metrics, and likely command higher long-term 
contracts, consequently increasing the posting fee the NPB teams receive. While they would lose 
their best players, teams could put their resources towards development, as the SoftBank Hawks 
have, and create a talent pool of players that can replace those that depart for the major leagues, 
or even more players with the potential of being posted. These earnings could also be remitted 
back to the parent company, dependent on the strategy the team chooses, Players would advocate 
for this, as for many, playing in the U.S. is their ultimate goal. “They are attracted to the higher 
pay and prestige of the major leagues and eager to be free of the rigid Japanese style discipline 
and the excessive practice of the Japanese system. As expatriate American pitcher Jeremy 
Powell, who plays for the Softbank Hawks, puts it, ‘These guys can't wait to get to the States’” 
(Whiting, 2008). Prior to the 2014 season, pitcher Masahiro Tanaka posted from the Rakuten 
Golden Eagles to the New York Yankees for the max fee of $20,000,000 and agreed to a 7-year 
deal worth $155,000,000 (See Figure 6). This is the highest amount of guaranteed money given 
through the posting system and represents possible future contracts with lower posting fees. 
While not every Japanese player can command a Tanaka-level contract, they can still expect to 
earn more than staying in Japan with the MLB’s minimum salary in 2020 nearly four times 
higher than the NPB’s (Allen, 2020; “Minimum Salary,” 2020).  
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 An argument against a more active posting system is that when popular NPB players 
move to the MLB, NPB TV viewership declines as more Japanese fans choose to watch their 
national heroes in morning MLB broadcasts over the NPB ones at night. Robert Whiting said in 
an article for Time, “TV ratings for the Tokyo Giants, in particular, have fallen several 
percentage points since live MLB casts became a regular morning affair in Japan.” For the 
Japanese people, it is a sense of pride to have their players competing with the best in baseball’s 
highest level. Prior to playing in 2018 season opening games at the Tokyo Dome against the 
Oakland A’s, Yusei Kikuchi of the Seattle Mariners said, “In Japan, baseball culture is huge, and 
they really respect the major leagues. I was one of those kids that always looked up to major 
leaguers. I'm really excited for fans and for young players to look at major leaguers and ask 
themselves, 'What do I have to do to get to this level?' I think it will be a great opportunity for 
coaches, kids and fans just to see major league baseball. Just a great opportunity for them to be 
there.” (Rivera, 2019). An anonymous Japanese official has differing views on MLB openers in 
Japan, saying “Every time the MLB holds one of their openers in Japan, sales of our opening 
week tickets go down.... We see more and more empty seats. It's not necessary for the big 
leaguers to come here” (Whiting, 2008). While the fans love watching players like Ichiro Suzuki, 
Masahiro Tanaka, and Kenta Maeda represent their country, NPB teams have historically viewed 
the loss of their best players to the MLB as something harmful to the success of their league.  
 However, more Japanese players in the MLB could have a positive effect on the 
popularity of the league. Out of the 288 foreign-born players on 2020 MLB opening day rosters, 
only 9 were from Japan (“Opening Day Rosters,” 2020). A successful Japanese player in the 
MLB could still be considered somewhat of a rarity, possibly explaining why MLB games are so 
popular in Japan. If more Japanese players were posting regularly and this became less of an 
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anomaly, the Japanese fans could be less likely to substitute the MLB for the NPB. If a player is 
expected to be posted after the season, excitement builds around that player and fans could be 
more likely to buy tickets and see him play before he departs. More Japanese players playing at 
the highest level could increase national interest in the sport and be beneficial to the NPB in the 
long run. Shohei Ohtani of the Los Angeles Angels, posted from the Nippon-Ham Fighters in 
2017, views the MLB influence on the Japanese fans as a positive thing, saying “It's a pretty rare 
opportunity for MLB games to be held in Japan, especially regular-season games -- and 
especially with the Mariners and Ichiro and Kikuchi playing there, there is a lot of interest. 
Hopefully for the Japanese people who are not baseball fans yet, it could lead them to become 
baseball fans” (Rivera, 2018).  
 The NPB could also see growth comparable to Major League Soccer in the United States. 
Once a league with relatively little popularity, the MLS has significantly improved its 
development facilities and the league has expanded rapidly as soccer popularity grows in the 
United States. The league is expecting to have 30 teams by 2022, up from 24 in 2019 (Young, 
2020). United States Men’s National Team coach Craig Berhalter said, “The owners of MLS, 
they invested a ton of money in youth academies, in facilities, in coaching, and now you’re 
seeing the fruits of their labor” (Straus, 2020). The MLS is experiencing this growth and success, 
despite the best U.S.-born players playing in Europe. Nine American-born players have played in 
the 2020-2021 UEFA Champion’s League with a record seven players playing in the span of one 
week in December 2020 (Goff, 2020; Karlsen, 2021). As potential soccer fans have seen U.S. 
players competing at the highest level, they have become more interested in the game and Major 
League Soccer has simultaneously become a fast-growing league with high potential for revenue 
growth.  
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 While it can’t be assumed that more Japanese players in the MLB will have a similar 
effect on the NPB, Japanese players at the highest levels could lead to overall growth. Teams 
could benefit directly from more frequent and increased posting fees, and indirectly from more 
excitement surrounding the sport, while maintaining a high level of play that fans would still be 
interested in watching. Regardless of the outcome, NPB teams will have to consider how they 
want to leverage their data in terms of their relationship with the MLB. 
 
Conclusion 
 Sooner or later, NPB teams will have to decide what their primary objective is. Do they 
serve only as a less expensive vehicle for advertising for their parent company? Or is their goal 
to be a sports franchise capable of competing for championships? Such decisions call into 
question the financial benefits of investing in sabermetric research. While most teams are now 
tracking data with TrackMan, many are still learning how to analyze it. “But that doesn’t mean 
that they know what to do with the data, in part because of the difficulty of finding analytical and 
computer programming talents in Japan who are also well-versed in baseball. Programming 
hasn’t been as widely accepted as a path to front offices as it has in the states, and teams are 
often staffed with employees of their parent companies in temporary positions.” (Lindbergh, 
2017b). Even if teams could find proper talent, it is expensive to pay salaries of full-time 
researchers, especially when most of the clubs aren’t currently profitable. The financial benefits 
of winning more games would have to outweigh the cost of hiring capable analysts. This is also 
assuming that the parent companies feel they would benefit from their baseball team winning, 
considering the recent financial woes and unprofitability of the league as a whole. It could be 
argued that on-field success would in turn increase the value of both the baseball franchise and 
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the parent company. As with the SoftBank Hawks, they have seen increased attendance due to 
their success over the past decade. The popularity of the team has grown, providing more 
exposure to the SoftBank brand. In 2020 the Pacific League, the SoftBank Hawks’ league even 
agreed to a deal to broadcast games in the U.S. with the hopes growing league exposure and 
interest, which gives the parent companies exposure to a large market outside of Japan (Coskrey, 
2020). 
 The level in which teams invest in sabermetrics depends entirely on the purpose of the 
teams in the eyes of their owners. Fukuoka has made it clear that they intend to win with the 
investment in their farm system facilities and player development, as well as their 
progressiveness in using analytics to gain an advantage. SoftBank appears to view the success of 
the Hawks as a success for the company. While many teams are beginning to follow their lead, 
whether it be through beginning to track data or using DeltaGraphs for consulting purposes, they 
must do so fully with a commitment to make the team as competitive as possible. Otherwise, any 
investment in sabermetric research without a full commitment to operate as a competitive 
baseball franchise is not supporting the objective of the team as a marketing tool.  
 The growth of sabermetrics in Japan marks a turning point in the country’s baseball 
culture, where the top professional teams of Nippon Professional Baseball will face strategic 
decisions that will significantly alter the aesthetic and financial implications of the league. 
Whether or not teams will fully embrace advanced analytics, as well as the different methods in 
which they leverage their research, is yet to be seen. This transitional period will ultimately 
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Figure 1. MLB International Player Distribution by Country 
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Figure 3. Map of Nippon Professional Baseball Teams Across Japan 
 
Figure 4. Table of Nippon Professional Baseball Teams 
 
Team City League Year Founded No. on Map
Chunichi Dragons Nagoya Central 1936 8
Hanshin Tigers Osaka (Nishinomiya) Central 1935 10
Hiroshima Toyo Carp Hiroshima Central 1950 11
Tokyo Yakult Swallows Tokyo (Shinjuku) Central 1950 5
Yokohama DeNA BayStars Yokohama Central 1949 7
Yomiuri Giants Tokyo (Bunkyō) Central 1934 6
Chiba Lotte Marines Chiba Pacific 1949 4
Fukuoka SoftBank Hawks Fukuoka Pacific 1938 12
Hokkaido Nippon-Ham Fighters Sapporo Pacific 1945 1
Orix Buffalos Osaka Pacific 1936 9
Saitama Seibu Lions Tokorozawa Pacific 1950 3
Tohoku Rakuten Golden Eagles Sendai Pacific 2005 2
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Posting Date Player NPB Team MLB Team Transfer Fee Contract Agreement Date Notes
2/2/99 Alejandro Quezada Hiroshima Toyo Carp Cincinnati Reds $400,001 3/2/99 signed a minor league contract
2/2/99 Timo Perez Hiroshima Toyo Carp none re-signed with the Carp on February 3, 1999 for 
¥34.5 million
11/9/00 Ichiro Suzuki Orix BlueWave Seattle Mariners $13,125,000 11/30/00 agreed to a 3-year, $14 million contract
1/3/02 Kazuhisa Ishii Tokyo Yakult Swallows Los Angeles Dodgers $11,260,000 2/2/02 agreed to a 4-year, $12.3 million contract
12/18/02 Akinori Otsuka Osaka Kintetsu Buffaloes none signed with the Dragons on March 20, 2003 for 
¥95 million
2/6/03 Ramon Ramirez Hiroshima Toyo Carp New York Yankees $300,500 3/9/03 signed a minor league contract
11/11/03 Akinori Otsuka Chunichi Dragons San Diego Padres $300,000 12/10/03 agreed to a two-year, $1.8 million contract
1/28/05 Norihiro Nakamura Orix Buffaloes Los Angeles Dodgers unknown 2/3/05 signed a minor league contract
11/22/05 Yusaku Iriki Hokkaido Nippon-Ham Fighters none failed to draw any bids and was released by 
Fighters on December 5, 2005; signed by the New 
York Mets on January 18, 2006 to a one-year, 
$750,000 contract
12/12/05 Shinji Mori Saitama Seibu Lions Tampa Bay Devil Rays $1,000,000 unknown agreed to a two year, $1.3 million contract
11/2/06 Daisuke Matsuzaka Saitama Seibu Lions Boston Red Sox $51,111,111.11 12/13/06 agreed to a six-year, $52 million contract
11/6/06 Akinori Iwamura Tokyo Yakult Swallows Tampa Bay Devil Rays $4,500,000 12/15/06 agreed to a three-year, $7.7 million contract
11/17/06 Kei Igawa Hanshin Tigers New York Yankees $26,000,194 12/28/06 agreed to a five-year, $20 million contract
12/18/08 Koji Mitsui Saitama Seibu Lions none failed to draw any bids from an MLB team, was re-
posted the next month
1/8/09 Koji Mitsui Saitama Seibu Lions none again failed to draw any bids, re-signed with the 
Lions on January 20, 2009 to a one-year contract 
for ¥57 million
11/2/10 Hisashi Iwakuma Tohoku Rakuten Golden Eagles Oakland Athletics $19,100,000 turned down a four-year, $15,250,000 contract to 
remain with Rakuten
11/15/10 Tsuyoshi Nishioka Chiba Lotte Marines Minnesota Twins $5,329,000 12/17/10 agreed to a three-year, $9.25 million contract
11/23/11 Hiroki Sanada Yokohama DeNA BayStars none Failed to draw any bids from an MLB team, later 
released by the BayStars
11/23/11 Hiroyuki Nakajima Saitama Seibu Lions New York Yankees $2,000,000 unable to reach agreement on a contract and 
returned to Seibu
12/12/11 Norichika Aoki Tokyo Yakult Swallows Milwaukee Brewers $2,500,000 1/17/12 agreed to a two-year, $2.5 million contract
12/8/11 Yu Darvish Hokkaido Nippon Ham Fighters Texas Rangers $51,700,000 1/18/12 agreed to a six-year, $60 million contract
12/26/13 Masahiro Tanaka Rakuten Golden Eagles New York Yankees $20,000,000 1/22/14 agreed to a seven-year, $155 million contract
11/2/15 Tony Barnette Tokyo Yakult Swallows none failed to draw any bids from an MLB team; later 
released by the Swallows; signed by the Texas 
Rangers on December 15, 2015 to a two-year, $3.5 
million contract
12/8/15 Kenta Maeda Hiroshima Carp Los Angeles Dodgers $20,000,000 1/7/16 agreed to an eight-year contract worth a minimum 
of $25 million and a maximum of $106.2 million
12/1/17 Shohei Ohtani Hokkaido Nippon-Ham Fighters Los Angeles Angels $20,000,000 12/8/17 agreed to a bonus of $2.32 million and the major 
league minimum salary ($545,000)
12/11/17 Kazuhisa Makita Saitama Seibu Lions San Diego Padres $500,000 1/6/18 agreed to a two-year, $3.8 million contract
12/3/18 Yusei Kikuchi Saitama Seibu Lions Seattle Mariners $10,275,000 12/31/18 agreed to a four-year, $56 million contract with 
options for up to three additional seasons
11/19/19 Yoshitomo Tsutsugo Yokohama DeNA BayStars Tampa Bay Rays $2,400,000 12/13/19 agreed to a four-year, $12 million contract
12/3/19 Ryosuke Kikuchi Hiroshima Toyo Carp none failed to secure a contract with any MLB team, 
signed a 4-year contract extension with the Carp 
on December 27, 2019 for ¥1.2 billion
12/3/19 Shun Yamaguchi Yomiuri Giants Toronto Blue Jays $1,200,000 12/17/19 agreed to a two-year, $6 million contract
11/26/20 Kohei Arihara Nippon Ham Fighters Texas Rangers $1,240,000 12/25/20 agreed to a two-year, $6.2 million contract
12/7/20 Haruki Nishikawa Nippon Ham Fighters none failed to secure a contract with any MLB team
12/7/20 Tomoyuki Sugano Yomiuri Giants none failed to secure a contract with any MLB team, re-
signed with the Giants
Version 3: Most Recent Agreement Implemented with Fee as a Percentage of Signed Contract
Version 2: Fee Determined by NPB Team with a Maximum of $20,000,000 and Players' Ability to Negotiate with Any MLB Team
Version 1: Blind Bidding System with No Maximum Fee; Team that Submitted Highest Bid Retained Exclusive Negotiation Rights
Past Succesful and Unsuccesful Postings from NPB to MLB




Figure 6. Table of Successful Japanese Postings to MLB 
 
 
Figure 7. Scatterplot of Decreasing Fees as a Percentage of the Total Cost for an MLB Team to 
Acquire a Player 
 
Player Year MLB Team Posting Fee Length of Contract in Years Size of Contract Total Cost to Team Fee/Total Cost
Ichiro Suzuki 2000 Seattle Mariners 13,125,000$            3 14,000,000$         27,125,000$         48.39%
Kazuhisa Ishii 2002 Los Angeles Dodgers 11,260,000$            4 12,300,000$         23,560,000$         47.79%
Akinori Otsuka 2003 San Diego Padres 300,000$                 2 1,800,000$           2,100,000$           14.29%
Shinji Mori 2005 Tampa Bay Devil Rays 1,000,000$              2 1,300,000$           2,300,000$           43.48%
Daisuke Matsuzaka 2006 Boston Red Sox 51,111,111$            6 52,000,000$         103,111,111$       49.57%
Akinori Iwamura 2006 Tampa Bay Devil Rays 4,500,000$              3 7,700,000$           12,200,000$         36.89%
Kei Igawa 2006 New York Yankees 26,000,194$            5 20,000,000$         46,000,194$         56.52%
Tsuyoshi Nishioka 2010 Minnesota Twins 5,329,000$              3 9,250,000$           14,579,000$         36.55%
Norichika Aoki 2011 Milwaukee Brewers 2,500,000$              2 2,500,000$           5,000,000$           50.00%
Yu Darvish 2011 Texas Rangers 51,700,000$            6 60,000,000$         111,700,000$       46.28%
Masahiro Tanaka 2013 New York Yankees 20,000,000$            7 155,000,000$       175,000,000$       11.43%
Kenta Maeda 2015 Los Angeles Dodgers 20,000,000$            8 25,000,000$         45,000,000$         44.44%
Shohei Ohtani* 2017 Los Angeles Angels 20,000,000$            5 12,269,259$         32,269,259$         61.98%
Kazuhisa Makita 2017 San Diego Padres 500,000$                 2 3,800,000$           4,300,000$           11.63%
Yusei Kikuchi 2018 Seattle Mariners 10,275,000$            4 56,000,000$         66,275,000$         15.50%
Yoshitomo Tsutsugo 2019 Tampa Bay Rays 2,400,000$              4 12,000,000$         14,400,000$         16.67%
Shun Yamaguchi 2019 Toronto Blue Jays 1,200,000$              2 6,000,000$           7,200,000$           16.67%
Kohei Arihara 2020 Texas Rangers 1,240,000$              2 6,200,000$           7,440,000$           16.67%
Successful Postings of Players that Received Major League Contracts
Version 1: Blind Bidding System with No Maximum Fee; Team that Submitted Highest Bid Retained Exclusive Negotiation Rights
Version 3: Most Recent Agreement Implemented with Fee as a Percentage of Signed Contract































































Posting Fee as a Percentage of Total Cost for MLB Team to 
Acquire Player through the Posting System
*At the time of his posting, Shohei Ohtani was under 25 years old and therefore subject to the MLB CBA’s international signing rules, which limited him to the rookie 
salary scale and a capped signing bonus. After three years, in his first year of arbitration, he agreed to a 2-year, $8.5 million contract. So, the size of his contract in this 
chart was calculated using the sum of his guaranteed earnings, including his signing bonus, over the 5-year duration of the contracts (2017 – 2021).  
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Figure 8. Table of NPB Parent Companies 
 
Figure 9. Table of NPB Teams with TrackMan Installed in Stadium 
 
Team League Parent Company/Owner Primary Industry/Type of Business
Chunichi Dragons Central Chunichi Shimbun Co., Ltd. Newspaper
Hanshin Tigers Central Hanshin Electric Railway Co., Ltd. Rail Transit
Hiroshima Toyo Carp Central Matsuda Family/Mazda Motor Corporation Automotive Manufacturing
Tokyo Yakult Swallows Central Yakult Honsha Co., Ltd.
Food, Beverage, and Pharmecuticals 
(Yogurt/Probiotic Drinks)
Yokohama DeNA BayStars Central DeNA Co., Ltd. Mobile Provider, E-commerce
Yomiuri Giants Central Yomiuri Shimbun Newspaper
Chiba Lotte Marines Pacific Lotte Corporation Food, Beverage, and Confections
Fukuoka SoftBank Hawks Pacific SoftBank Group Corp.
Telecommunications, Technology, Financial 
Services
Hokkaido Nippon-Ham Fighters Pacific NH Foods Ltd. Food Processing, Meat Packing
Orix Buffalos Pacific ORIX Corporation Financial Services
Saitama Seibu Lions Pacific Seibu Railway Company, Ltd. Rail Transit
Tohoku Rakuten Golden Eagles Pacific Rakuten Group, Inc. E-commerce
Team League Stadium Has TrackMan?
First Instance of 
TrackMan Installation 
(Month-Year)
Chunichi Dragons Central Valetin Dome Nagoya Yes March-18
Hanshin Tigers Central Hanshin Koshien Stadium No Evidence N/A
Hiroshima Toyo Carp Central MAZDA Zoom-Zoom Stadium Hiroshima No Evidence N/A
Tokyo Yakult Swallows Central Meiji Jingu Stadium Yes March-18
Yokohama DeNA BayStars Central Yokohama Stadium Yes October-19
Yomiuri Giants Central Tokyo Dome Yes July-17
Chiba Lotte Marines Pacific ZOZO Marine Stadium No Evidence N/A
Fukuoka SoftBank Hawks Pacific Fukuoka PayPay Dome Yes April-17
Hokkaido Nippon-Ham Fighters Pacific Sapporo Dome Yes October-16
Orix Buffalos Pacific Kyocera Dome Osaka Yes August-16
Saitama Seibu Lions Pacific MetLife Dome Yes December-16
Tohoku Rakuten Golden Eagles Pacific Rakuten Seimei Park Miyagi Yes April-17
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Figure 9A1. Photo Evidence of TrackMan in Valentin Dome Nagoya (Earliest Found 
Occurrence) – by Matsuura Yuichi (March 2018) 
 
Figure 9A2. TrackMan in Valentin Dome Nagoya Confirmation – by よしくん (April 2019) 
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Figure 9B1. Photo Evidence of TrackMan in Meiji Jingu Stadium (Earliest Found Occurrence) – 





















Figure 9C1. Photo Evidence of TrackMan in Yokohama Stadium (Earliest Found Occurrence) – 
by Shingeru Sanada (July 2018) 
 




Figure 9D1. Photo Evidence of TrackMan in Tokyo Dome (Earliest Found Occurrence) – by 
Halee Pagel (July 2017) 
 
Figure 9D2. TrackMan in Tokyo Dome Confirmation – by Zack Hample (March 2019) 
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Figure 9E. Photo Evidence of TrackMan in Fukuoka PayPay Dome (Only Found Occurrence) – 
by 石江千成 (April 2017) 
 
Figure 9F. Photo Evidence of TrackMan in Sapporo Dome (Only Found Occurrence) – by 
Kousakushima (October 2016) 
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Figure 9G. Photo Evidence of TrackMan in Kyocera Dome Osaka (Only Found Occurrence) – 













Figure 9H1. Photo Evidence of TrackMan in MetLife Dome (Earliest Found Occurrence) – by 
KAMING CO., LTD. (December 2016) 
 
Figure 9H2. TrackMan in MetLife Dome Confirmation – by KAMING CO., LTD. (April 2019) 
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Figure 9I. Photo Evidence of TrackMan in Rakuten Seimei Park Miyagi (Only Found 









Figure 10. Photo Evidence of TrackMan in Tama Home Stadium (Fukuoka SoftBank Hawks 
Farm Base) – by 冨田茂 (September 2016) 
 
Figure 11. YouTube Video of Takuya Nakashima 12-pitch At-Bat (Link) 
 
